华东师范大学学报（自然科学版） ›› 2020, Vol. 2020 ›› Issue (6): 99-104.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-5641.202021002

• 计算机科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

破坏性创新技术的采纳过程: 一个理论分析

王晔, 曲林迟   

  1. 上海海事大学 经济管理学院, 上海 201306
  • 收稿日期:2020-01-06 发布日期:2020-12-01
  • 通讯作者: 曲林迟, 男, 教授, 研究方向为交通运输工程. E-mail: Lcqu@shmtu.edu.cn E-mail:Lcqu@shmtu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:王 晔, 男, 高级工程师, 博士, 研究方向为交通运输经济与管理. E-mail: markwjh@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划(2017YFC0803700)

The adoption process for disruptive innovation: A theoretical analysis

WANG Ye, QU Linchi   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
  • Received:2020-01-06 Published:2020-12-01

RichHTML

596

PDF

120

摘要： 回顾历史不难发现, 许多行业总会间歇性地产生一些破坏性创新技术. 值得注意的是, 那些提出新技术并实现产业化的企业, 通常不是技术和资金实力最强的在位龙头企业, 而是规模较小、技术实力不足的后发企业. 针对这种现象, 基于两阶段博弈模型进行了分析解释. 基于模型分析, 在位企业在传统技术方面的优势会阻碍其开展破坏性技术创新, 而后发企业能利用后发优势, 策略性地压低新技术产品的利润, 将在位企业阻挡在新产品市场以外.

关键词: 破坏性创新, 两阶段博弈, 转换成本, 后发优势

Abstract: Looking back on history, we observe that many industries generate disruptive innovations intermittently. It is worth noting that those who adopt new technologies for commercialization are usually not the incumbent leading companies with the strongest technical and financial strength, but rather companies that are established later in time, who operate on a smaller scale and with less technical strength. This article explains this phenomenon based on a two-stage game model. The advantages of incumbent companies in traditional technologies often become obstacles in their switch to innovative technologies. Companies established later in time can leverage the late-comer advantage to strategically reduce profits of new technology products, thereby blocking incumbent enterprises from the new product market.

Key words: disruptive innovation, two-stage game, switching cost, late-comer advantage

中图分类号: